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PREFACE
This study was conducted to (1) analyze current oil spill legislation for the
insertion of proactive strategies which encourage the prevention of marine accidents, if
any; (2) illustrate the commonality of human error factors, the cause of most high-
consequence low-probability accidents (e.g. oil spills), across industries~ and (3) suggest
the usage of influence diagrams as an effective preliminary tool for identifying causal
relationships in accidents. These diagrams would then aid in error analysis and the
eventual development of error management programs. Two case studies: the sinking of
the London Valour and the Bhopal explosion were reviewed to illustrate the need for
human error control from all levels of operations.
Since the human error element exists in almost all technological processes
considerations must be developed for the actual compression of its frequency and the
containment of its consequences.
I sincerely thank my masters committee -- Drs. James Lawler (Chair), Ken
Eastman, and Franz Von Sauer -- for their flexibility and support in the completion of
this research. I would also like to thank Mrs. Beth McTernan for her continued
understanding, encouragement, and input during the compilation of my research.
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INTRODUCTION
Currently, the United States consumes approximately
seventeen million barrels of oil daily and oil imports have
increased almost 35% since 1986. 2 The increasing cargo
capacity of transportation vessels coupled with the
increasing demand for oil imports has expanded the potential
for more frequent marine accidents. In 1965 the average
size of an oil tanker was 27,000 deadweight tons (DWT.) a
fraction of the Exxon Valdez's 214,000 DWT. and the 500,000-
ton supertankers now plying the seas. l The world fleet of
1969 was comprised of 6,103 tankers, 1,416 of those tankers
were having accidents.! Reports, as early as 1970, have
estimated that 5.1 million gallons of oil were accidentally
discharged from tanker ships in U.s. ports.! It was
calculated in 1983 and 1984 that 11,250 oil spills occurred
annually in the United States. And tankers, oil terminals,
and other oil transportation-related sources were the cause
of 2.1 million metric tons (635 million gallons) of
petroleum discharge into the marine environment.
These reports demonstrate the accelerating frequency of
marine accidents and a trend of increasing oil
transportation and consumption. It has been realized that
increases in the transportation of oil potentiates increases
in the risks for future spills. Expanding the number of
vessels transiting a highly congested waterway can only
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serve as a catalyst for marine accidents. The actual oil
spill however, is not the fundamental problem.
It has been estimated that 60 to 80 percent of
accidents in complex systems, such as the maritime transport
of oil, are attributable to human error. 3 Every activity
conducted in any organization involves the human element,
and in most cases it is the human element that is identified
as the causative agent of an accident. Simple omissions of
responsibility, miscommunication, or employing individuals
unacquainted with operational procedures or equipment may be
the origin of such errors. For example, an overflow of a
filling tank during a bunkering operation caused a spill of
500 gallons of bu~ker fuel (heavy oil used to fuel tankers) .
An inspection determined that the spill was caused by the
opening of an incorrect valve and that the inexperience of
the crew was identified as a causative factor. 61 To prevent
or reduce the frequency of like accidents the human error
element must be addressed as the fundamental cause of most
marine casualties.
Unfortunately, concerted efforts from the government,
industry, and public to minimize the human error element
when transporting oil have been incremental at best.
Currently, governmental and industrial organizations are
spending about 90 percent of their time and resources to
perpetuate the status quo: oil spill response - containment
and recovery; and about 10 percent on spill prevention; the
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key for protecting marine environments and organisms and
promoting spill abatement. 3? While containment and recovery
operations justify development and implementation, the
benefit to society cannot solely depend on post-spill
responses. Government and industry must develop proactive
measures to control the frequency of accidents perpetuated
by human factors. Proactive measures should incorporate
pre-spill preparedness such as enhanced training and
education requirements, national certification of corporate
maritime transportation procedures, and provisions which
take in to account human nature. Studies must also be
conducted to fully understand the implications of human
errors in highly technical environments. The results of
such studies would enable government and industry to
redesign processes and procedures which will minimize the
occurrence and the effects of human malperformance.
Therefore, the focus of this study is to illustrate
human error as a significant obstacle in oil pollution
control. For the ease of display the research will be
presented in three phases. The first phase evaluates the
effectiveness of current oil spill legislation in actually
preventing (not just deterring) error-causing behavior.
Next an analysis of human error types and frequencies in
other highly technical industries will be conducted. The
purpose of this phase is to illustrate the ubiquitous nature
of human error in various technical operations. Lastly,
3
this study will offer the use of an influence diagram as a
cost-effective corporate technique to assist in error
detection and control management.
Hopefully, this study will stimulate discussion of oil
pollution abatement through proactive legislation,
emphasizing preventive mechanisms, and increased industry
involvement towards the minimization of human-based
accidents and their adverse impacts on the natural
environment.
4
CHAPTER ONE
OPA 90:
A POSSIBLE DETERRENT FOR OIL SPILLS
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the
effectiveness of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) in
curtailing or preventing the frequency of marine accidents
(e.g. oil spills). The intent of the legislation is
apparent; to significantly reduce the impacts of marine
accidents on u.s. industries and shores. Legislatively, OPA
appears to make great strides in minimizing the degree of
oil spilled and its impacts on both economic and ecologic
environments. What is lacking in the legislation however,
is an obvious effort to prevent spills from occurring.
The most productive method used to minimize the
frequency of oil spills is to address the fundamental cause
of the majority of marine accidents; human error. OPA fails
at identifying and responding to the reality that human
error is the primary cause of 80% of marine accidents.
Instead, it incorporates provisions that marginally deter
actions involved in marine accidents. Therefore, the act's
effectiveness in preventing accidents such as the Exxon
grounding is partial at best.
The author intends to demonstrate these points by
analyzing several sections within OPA that have been
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proclaimed as highly effective implements for prevention of
marine accidents. These provisions however, are only
activated in response to an oil spill. Therefore, the
preventative qualities of the Act cannot stand by themselves
to foster proactive action. They maintain a supplemental
position in the fight for pollution abatement in marine
environments. It is suggested the efforts of the Oil
Pollution Act would best serve the public interests if
prevention was the focal point of the legislation rather
than reaction.
Behind the Act
In August of·.1990 both Houses of Congress unanimously
enacted the Oil Pollution of Act of 1990 (OPA) .15 Public
pressure and ecological concerns sparked by the Exxon Valdez
catastrophe in March of 1989, prompted the expediency of the
act's decree. Ironically, however, Congress had been
considering oil spill legislation since 1975. 15
For approximately fifteen years Congress had been
working to consolidate and rationalize oil spill response
mechanisms under various federal laws, including §311 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act-
(CWA) , the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (TAPAA), The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (OSCLA), and
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the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund) .15
In 1980 Congress came close to passing comprehensive
oil spill provisions as part of CERCLA, only to have those
provisions omitted in the lame duck session that finally
enacted CERCLA. 1S Instead of oil spill provisions, CERCLA
contained a petroleum exclusion to make clear that oil
spills were to be governed by a different statutory scheme.
Given these inclusions the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has
been deemed, by some, a comprehensive and thorough program
to resolve the difficult political issues that had hobbled
effective oil spill prevention and cleanup efforts under the
previous uncoordinated legal regime. 15
It took ten years of deliberation and a catastrophic
event on u.S. shores to initialize strategies for protecting
marine environments: aesthetic, economic, and ecologic. The
question however, remains: does the current statutory scheme
offer substantial security for the prevention of marine
accidents? Some may argue that OPA is a watered down
attempt to reduce the frequency of oil spills, but does
focus on increasing the amount of oil recovered. 62 If this
is proven so, then little has been done to protect the
quality of u.s. marine environments from the intrusion of
continual oil pollution.
Only through legislative review can regulations be
evaluated and redesigned to better serve their intended
7
purpose. Studying the contents and the tone of the Oil
Pollution Act should satisfy this concern. Do the
provisions within OPA actively promote the prevention of oil
spills or do they simply enforce demands on spillers after a
marine accident has occurred?
TITLE I - LIABILITY PROVISIONS
The liability provisions outlined in Title I of OPA
are patterned closely to those of CERCLA and §311 of the
Clean Water Act. Compared to §311 OPA makes it easier for
the government to establish liability against a party
responsible for causing or contributing to an oil discharge
to a substantial threat of an oil discharge. 1s
Defenses and exclusions to liabilities under OPA are
more limited than those under §311 of CWA and under §107(b}
of CERCLA. 1S Section l003(a) of the Oil Pollution Act, as
with most environmental legislation, absolves the
responsible party from liability imposed by §1002 (Appendix
A) if that party proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the incident resulted solely from (1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; (3)an act or omission of a third party;
or (4)some combination of (1) ,(2), or(3) .46
Interestingly, OPA omits an important Clean Water Act
defense. Under §311(f) (1) (C) of CWA, "negligence on the
part of the United States Government" is a complete defense
if the discharge resulted solely from that discharge. 1s
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This defense was obviously inspired by the inadequate
efforts of the Coast Guard in its employment of the Vessel
Traffic System (VTS) during the Exxon Valdez disaster
(Because of budget constraints the Coast Guard neglected
needed upgrading of the Price William Sound VTS. This
allowed for its 30% operability rate and failure to identify
and respond to the Valdez approaching glacial obstacles in
the traff ic lane) .32
In review of these liabilities no real incentive has
been established within the legislation to actively promote
preventive procedures. The monetary figures associated with
liability issues must bear a significant penalty in order to
foster prevention. If liability costs are marginal compared
to the costs of compliance, deep pocket companies could
simply choose to pay cleanup costs rather than redesigning
their policies. For example, Ford Motor Company chose to
compensate injured parties when the Pinto's gas tank
exploded upon impact in a rear collision. Given this
corporate nature it is the responsibility of the legislature
to stimulate preventative behaviors before the accidents
occur. Would unlimited liabilities pressure companies into
increased awareness of neglectful activities?
Some dispute that liabilities in response to marine
accidents should not carry any caps or limits (Table I).
Those affected by the spill can see the importance of
9
unlimited liability while those causing the spill are
thankful for the limits imposed under OPA.
TABLE I.
RESPONsmLE PARTY LIABILITY LIMITS FOR
TOTAL LIABILITY AND REMOVAL COSTS PER INCIDENT
Vessel Size
* $1,200 per gross ton
greater than 3,000 gross tons
3,000 or less
any other vessel
on shore facility & deepwater port
offshore facility other than (DWP)**
Dollar liability limit
or
10,000,000
2,000,000
600/gross ton or
500,000, whichever is greater
350,000,000
75,000,000
* figures are first calculated using $1,200 per gross ton~ the liability limit will
be set at the greater of the calculations
** DWP = deepwater port
Data generated from the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
These limits do not apply if the responsible party
fails or refuses to (l)report the incident as required by
law, (2)cooperate with a responsible official in connection
with removal activities, (3) comply, without sufficient
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cause, with an administrative or judicial order issued under
§311(c) or (e) .54 The waiver of the liability
limit assures that enforcement of the removal orders is not
undercut by the limit.
Since the Oil Pollution Act does not preempt state
legislation responsible parties may be subject to additional
costs required by state measures. Contrary, to industry
dogma the non-preemption clause may serve as an impetus for
the prevention of spills. For example, the liability limit
for tank vessels is set at the greater of (1)$1,200 per
gross ton or (2}$10 million if the vessel exceeds 3,000
gross tons and $2 million if the vessel is less than 3,000
gross tons. If a company satisfied the $10 million
liability cap and was then sued under state legislation an
additional amount comparable to or possibly exceeding the
liability cap imposed by OPA could economically devastate
smaller companies.
Advocates of non-preemption argued that the 24 coastal
states that have oil pollution liability and compensation
laws have benefitted from increased assurance of additional
cleanup and compensation provisions outlined in OPA. 1S
Moreover, victims of oil spills need some way to get beyond
the limits prescribed by federal law to be compensated for
their damages. 46 For without these provisions impacted
communities would have no means of recovering their cleanup
costs from an accident they did not create. California and
11
Washington have successfully enacted more stringent
compensation laws than federally mandated and many more
coastal states are to follow.
The liability provision is a significant mechanism
within the Act because it wakens spillers to the extreme
monetary responsibilities of negligent behavior. If OPA, in
its original design, preempted state and international laws
the teeth would have been taken out of the provision. After
federal liability requirements had been met spillers would
be able to leave a state's shores contaminated with oil
without further liability. Fortunately, for coastal states
this is no longer a major concern.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES
Before passage of the Oil Pollution Act, the penalties
available to the federal government under §311 to punish
unpermitted discharges of oil and hazardous substances had
not been significantly amended since the early 1970'8. 15 In
view of the damages inflicted by the Valdez spill, the
available penalties looked too weak, especially in
comparison with other portions of the clean Water Act and
other environmental statutes. Other examples of inadequate
penalty requirements can be found after reviewing previous
penalty assessments. For example, In the five year span of
1983 to 1987, 110 oil spills occurred off the coast of the
state of Washington alone. The cumulative penalty figure
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for those 110 spills barely reached over $400,000 (Table
II) .11 Today one spill can produce fines well into the
hundred thousands of dollars.
TABLE n
STATE OF WASHINGTON'S OIL SPILLS &
PENALTIES ASSESSMENT FROM 1979 To 1990
Calendar
year
Oil Spills
Number Dollars Assessed
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
8
2
9
4
15
20
19
30
26
2
3
7
6,800
500
17,750
2,350
20,850
79,250
24,950
233,750
77,200
14,500
45,000
23,000
Adapted from the Department of Ecology: Washington State 1991 Data Book
Currently, three types of penalties, administrative,
civil, and criminal, may be imposed on the owner, operator,
or person in charge of any facility or vessel from which oil
or a hazardous substance is discharged. Administrative
penalties can range from $10,000 to $125,000 per violation.
Civil penalties include: (1)$25,000 per day of such
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discharge; or (2) $1,000 per barrel of oil discharged, or
per unit of the reportable quantity of the hazardous
substance discharged. 54 These penalties can be quite
prohibitive in that they are directly imposed upon the
individual at fault. The proverbial corporate shield no
longer protects the negligent worker. Violators are held
responsible for their own actions which should inspire
preventative mind sets.
These two penalty schemes can also be an effective tool
for encouraging better performance among managers and
subordinates within any echelon of the corporate ladder. It
is the opinion of the author that the threat of potential
criminal investigation and prosecution motivates increased
awareness to detail and indolent behavior. Severe criminal
penalties are available to punish violators under section
311 of the Clean Water Act (Table III) .15
For negligent violations, penalties include a $25,000
fine and one year of imprisonment. For knowing violations,
the fines are $50,000 and a term of imprisonment not to
exceed three years. For "knowing endangerment", a violation
that places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury, the fine is $250,000 for an
individual, $1 million for an organization, and a term of
imprisonment of not more than 15 years. 54
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TABLE III
PENALTIES IMPOSED FOR NEGLIGENT AND KNOWING
VIOLATIONS OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
Violation
negligent behavior
knowing violation
knowing endangerment
Adapted from the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Penalty
$25,000 fine
1 year imprisonment
$50,000 fine and up
to 3 years
imprisonment
$250,000 fine for an
individual,
$1,000,000 fine for
an organization, and
up to 15 years
imprisonment
Until the 1990 amendments of the Clean Water Act, the
only criminal charge that could be brought for discharges to
navigable waters was for discharging without a permit. 15
These amendments give prosecutors much more to work with,
and raise the stakes in criminal proceedings. Penalties of
this magnitude coupled with other preventative measures
could be a significant catalyst for promoting effective
pollution abatement programs. Hopefully, the prospect of
criminal prosecution for negligent discharges of oil will
place a premium on diligent training and operations in the
oil industry.
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Equipment Standards
One of the most controversial topics of both
legislative debates and the Valdez spill focused on the
proposed effectiveness of double hulled vessels. Could the
spill have been prevented if the Valdez was required to be a
double hull vessel rather than a single hull? It has been
speculated that the magnitude of the spill could have been
largely minimized or even prevented with the insertion of a
double hull.
Since the largest hole created by the grounding was
sized at six feet in depth, the inner plating of the vessel
would barely have been punctured (spacing between the inner
and outer plates of twin skinned vessels is approximately
six feet). Interestingly, however, before the Alaskan
Pipeline was built an agreement had been made to Congress by
the Interior Secretary, Roger Morton, that any newly built
tankers used in the Alaska trade would have double bottoms. 8
The Valdez, a single skinned tanker would have been in
violation of that agreement had it not been dropped as a
result of pressure from the oil industry.
In support of the oil industry's goals, as with any
industry, for yielding the greatest profit at least cost,
tankers have been traditionally designed to carry as much
cargo as possible into as little steel as possible. This
idea has contributed to the manufacturing of ULCC's (ultra
large crude carriers), such as Exxon Valdez, with a steel to
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cargo ratio of one to six. s Construction such as this
perpetuates the vulnerability and increases the probability
of tankers rupturing when coming in contact with stationary
objects, hence illustrating the need for double bottom
vessel design.
Documented incidents have proven that a second layer of
steel on tanker bottoms significantly decreases the risk for
loss of cargo when involved in a grounding, but do not
prevent the accident from occurring. For example, in 1979 a
double hulled tanker, El Paso Paul Keyser, ran aground in
the Strait of Gibraltar at a speed of 17 to 18 knots. 8 The
outer hull was torn out under four of the six cargo tanks,
the inner hull however, only suffered a dent and retained
all of its 95,000 cubic meters of cargo. In 1975 the Coast
Guard determined that out of 30 oil tanker groundings
resulting in spills 28 (96%) could have been prevented if
the vessels were designed with double hull construction. 8
As with any preventative measure required by
governmental action, industries have several arguments
discrediting the propositions. In this case the oil
industry offered two objections to the twin skin design.
The first is that an explosion could occur if gasses escaped
into the vacant area between the inner and outer plating.
As to date however, not one explosion has been attributed to
twin skin design even though 530 tankers have them. s
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Secondly, industry claims that if water by chance entered
the space between the inner and outer plating it could cause
the tanker to loose buoyancy, increase its difficulty for
salvage (the actual removal of the ship from the accident
site), and possibly cause it to capsize. In the case of
Exxon Valdez it has been estimated that the Valdez would
have lost 60% less oil had it been double hulled. a
Section 4115 of OPA establishes the double hull
requirements for tank vessels. 54 Various designated vessel
standards have been outlined for a timely, guideline for the
phasing out of single hulled vessels (Appendix B). For
example, if a vessel is of at least 5,000 gross tons but
less than 15,000 ·gross tons and is 40 years or older with a
single hulled bottom it may not operate in the navigable
waters of the United States after January 1, 1995.
An inverse relationship exists between the tonnage
increase of single hull vessels and the age of the vessels
when determining the permissibility of operation in the
navigable waters of the United States. In the case of a
single hull vessel which is at least 30,000 gross tons and
28 years old it too may not operate upon the navigable
waters after January 1, of 1995. All vessels that have a
single hull will be restricted from operation upon the
navigable waters by January 1, 2010. 54 Double sides and
double bottom vessels, different from double hull, are to be
completely phased out by 2015. The significance of the
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double hull design is that it requires the phasing out of
unsafe vessels from sailing u.s. waterways.
Opponents of the double hull design offer the
hydrostatic balance concept (HB) as a more economic and
effective alternative to the costly double hull design
required by OPA. This design reduces the size of the cargo
in order to cause an ingress of water instead of an outflow
of oil in the event of a breach in the vessel's skin. 42
More water pressure is exerted from the ocean onto the hull
than is exerted from inside the vessel onto the ocean. This
allows for an influx of sea water and prevents the vessel
from losing its cargo. The reduced carrying capacity of
this design would ultimately increase the amount of vessel
traffic in an already congested transportation system;
thereby, increasing the probability of more frequent marine
accidents.
Vessel Personnel Standards
The vessel manning, equipment, and construction
standards are imposed through amendments to numerous
provisions of the navigation laws in Title 46 of the United
States Code. 1s These provisions largely reflect the
public's perceptions that alcohol problems, coupled with
chronic understaffing on tankers contributed to the Exxon
disaster. This also supports the idea that Oil Pollution
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Act was largely enacted to satisfy austere public pressure
for action. 15
Under Title IV, OPA demands tighter controls on the
licensing and acceptance of crewman and revamps traditional
procedures involving vessel employment. As a result the
Coast Guard's authority has been expanded to include
checking the qualifications and performances of crewman and
officers of vessels within u.s. jurisdiction. It is
currently required that an individual applying for a
license, if applicable, make available any information about
drunk driving from the National Drivers Registry and about
prior criminal records; the applicant must also submit to
drug and alcohol testing. A five-year term limit,
paralleling that also required for terrestrial transit, for
licenses and certificates replaces the traditional
indefinite licensing term. Periodic license renewals,
retesting of licenses for drug and alcohol abuse, and
rechecking for criminal records and drunk driving
convictions is now required. Section 4102 makes it easier
for the Coast Guard to suspend, revoke, and terminate,
licenses and certificates for drug and alcohol abuse,
negligence I misconduc,t, or incompetence. 32
One of the major issues in the Valdez case was that the
crew member attending the autopilot on the bridge was not
properly licensed for his duty. How many other marine
accidents were caused by unqualified under-the-influence
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crewman? To answer this question the Seattle Times and the
Coast Guard conducted a timely study analyzing the number of
crew members drunk on duty. It was found that of the 92
merchant ship-crew members involved in alcohol-related cases
between 1984 to 1989, 86 (approximately 95%) were proven
intoxicated.! Penalties included the suspensions and
revocations of licenses, and probationary measures (Figure
1) .
45 auapen.ion. 52.0'
.--------
5 revocation. 6.0'
36 probations only 42.0'
Figure 1. Penalties Imposed for Alcohol Related Cases
Between 1984 and 1989. (Data Adapted from the
State of Alaska Final Report, February 1990)
It is obvious that the insertion of the enhanced vessel
manning requirements is fundamental to the safe passage of
vessels.
21
Discussion
Most of the above provisions serve as mere deterrents
to pollution, but are significant measures to inspire spill
abatement activities. To be considered truly proactive,
legislation must address problems at the fundamental level.
What causes the need for regulation; the spill itself or the
frequency of the event? These are questions that should be
adequately answered prior to the construction of oil spill
legislation. The Oil Pollution Act would seem to have
covered all concerns regarding "what to do about oil
spills". The ideas however, governing "what to do to
prevent spills" have not yet been developed. Therefore, a
few significant s~eps are missing from the process required
to reduce the frequency and amount of oil spills.
Some suggestions follow:
(1) On a global scale, the unilateral actions imposed
by the u.s. when designing OPA ultimately weaken efforts to
promote consistency of international maritime trade. The
unilateral decision to require a double hulled vessel in
u.S. waterways could be construed as a discriminatory
maneuver against developing countries. Their ability to
compete in international trade would be significantly
impeded. Should the United States be concerned with the
ability of foreign countries to successfully compete in
international import markets? Most certainly, the United
States imports great quantities of petroleum annually. Most
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of this resource comes from oil rich, but geographically
poor countries. It would be in this country's best interest
to maintain a positive international relationship between
nations the u.s. depends on for oil. By excluding these
countries from trade with the United States can only foster
future ramifications.
It has been argued that u.s. law should provide for the
protection of u.s. waters, resources, and regulatory
standards regardless of whether international standards are
consistent with them. While this point is acknowledged,
foreign flag vessels violating u.s. standards frequent u.s.
waters. It is far too easy for foreign flag ships to
disregard u.s. labor laws regarding minimum competency
standards for mariners operating on u.s. ships. The
integrity standards for sea going vessels may also be
compromised when allowing foreign flag vessels maintaining
inadequate vessel performance standards into the ports of
the u.s. The author believes it is congress' duty to remove
isolationist views and accept the responsibility of
promoting a global standard for transport. The United
States can lead the global community by demanding universal
standards of all vessels not only those frequenting u.s.
waterways. For example, if international standards of
training were developed crewmen would be held accountable
for their own qualifications and performances. Competition
would arise between qualified individuals and better
23
standards of performance, from deckhands to controllers,
could be achieved.
By implementing unilateral legislation that does not
allow preemption by international compacts or promote an
international standard of safety/competency only hinders the
movement for increased participation both globally and
nationally for pollution abatement during the transport of
oil.
(2) Many of the provisions previously discussed in
this chapter (e.g. liabilities, penalties, and vessel
equipment) were designed with the assumption that a marine
casualty had ensued. For the Oil Pollution Act to be
considered a proactive piece of legislation it must require
action prior to an accident. Liabilities and penalties
would be mute issues for vessel owners if marine casualties
did not occur. A more efficient and economic solution to
the double hull controversy would be to focus on the
reduction of collisions, groundings, and strandings rather
than concentrating on providing extra protection for a
damaged vessel. Simply requiring post-spill action does
nothing to prevent the continual polluting of our marine
environments.
(3) OPA does not address human error as a primary
cause of marine accidents. Factors such as inattention,
fatigue, and communication barriers when using crews of
different nationalities create a range of conflicts that
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undoubtedly lead to marine casualties. More regulatory
emphasis must be attached to the reality of the human error
element in high-consequence low-probability accidents. The
focal point of the legislation must be directed toward the
source of the problem; human error resulting from poorly
qualified, inattentive, and inadequately trained crew
members. Therefore, the implementation of advanced training
programs and competency reviews/tests (including literacy
tests) must be seriously considered.
Provisions are included in both the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) and the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) that require the development and
implementation of programs for the education and training of
employers and employees. 44,45 These programs are aimed at the
avoidance and prevention of unsafe or unhealthful acts
within the working environment. Special emphasis is also
required for such training and education with respect to
hazardous chemicals. For example, under section 408 of the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), a lead abatement worker
training and accreditation program is established. 4 Other
environmental legislation governing hazardous materials and
procedures understand the importance of well trained
employees. The Oil Pollution Act misses the mark by failing
to require any kind of training mechanism to curtail marine
accidents perpetuated by human error.
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In view of federal inefficiencies the responsibility of
spill reduction must reside with the private industries and
nonprofit organizations. Afterall, it is the private sector
who must hire, supervise, and train the seamen. And it is
private sector who must insist on the highest standards of
operation from our seamen, our shore staff, and our
governing organizations.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HUMAN ERROR FACTOR:
A TECHNOLOGICAL REALITY
Introduction
This chapter intends to cover a wide range of issues
regarding the occurrence of human error. Until recently the
attributability of human error as a cause of low
probability-high consequence accidents, such as oil spills,
had been scarcely acknowledged. Today fortunately, many
states and other organizations are calling for the
investigation of this issue. Studies are being conducted to
identify the commonality of human errors across industries.
And the ramifications of such accident events to the natural
environment are becoming more prevalent to the average
public. Hopefully, this will inspire a more active effort
to redesign those operations that require individuals to
perform beyond their capabilities (e.g. acquired knowledge
and skill needed to perform desired tasks expediently) and
the natural constraints of human abilities (e.g. extensive
work hours and number of tasks in one duty) .
Realistically, the human error element cannot be
reduced to zero probability, but it can be significantly
controlled. By addressing human error control using a
systematic approach, the safety, efficiency, and motivation
of personnel can be improved, which will reduce the
27
frequency of accidents perpetuated by human error. The
Exxon Valdez catastrophe is a primary example of what human
malperformance can produce for society (Appendix C) .
The most effective way to reduce the risk of oil
spills, and other human related failures, is by raising the
level of human performance in every day maritime practices.
New and creative incentives must be developed to increase
personal and corporate accountability in ways that will
result in higher levels of human attentiveness at every
stage of industry practice.
Errors Across Technologies
Our infrastructure is the envy of the world and the
systems upon which our nation depends are vast, interactive,
natural and artificial. Theses systems provide and
facilitate energy, defense, nutrition, extraction,
production, transportation, communication, and growing
quality of life. 27 Their demonstrated reliability is high,
but when they fail, costs exacted in human, environmental,
and economic terms as well as in quality of life can be
immense.
The primary cause of their failure is human error.
Approximately 60 to 80 percent of accidents in complex
systems are attributed to human error. 27 Each year, a
significant number of the oil spills reported to state and
federal officials are directly or indirectly caused by
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human error factors. Ironically, government and industry
are spending about 90 percent of their time and resources on
spill response, and only about 10 percent on spill
prevention. 38
What are the causes of human error? It varies slightly
from one industry to another because of differences in task
designs and procedures. But significant similarities can be
found after thorough investigation of error events. The
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) conducted a
study of 180 nuclear power plant accident reports issued in
both 1983 and 1984; 387 root causes were identified (Figure
2). It was concluded that 92% of the root causes were man-
made. Of that 92%, 52% were attributed to human performance
and 33% were caused by design deficiencies. A breakdown of
the human performance problems included: deficient
procedures and documentation 43%, lack of knowledge or
training 18%, failure to follow procedures 16%,
miscommunication 6% I etc. (Table IV). 4-'
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Bu••n p.r~or••Dce 52.0.
Other/Unknown 3.0.
Figure 2. INPO Analysis of 387 Root Causes Identified in 180 Significant
Event Reports in both 1983 and 1984. (Generated from Human
Error - J. Reason 1991.)
TABLE IV
A BREAKDOWN OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE
PROBLEMS FROM THE INPO STUDY- 1983-1984
Human Performance Problems
Deficient procedures or documentation: 43%
Lack of knowledge or training: 18%
Failure to follow procedures: 16%
Deficient planning or scheduling: 10%
Miscommunication: 6%
Deficient supervision: 3%
Policy problems: 2%
Other: 2%
Adapted from "Human Error", J. Reason - 1991.
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In an analysis of underground mining accidents, the
listed causes of human error fell under six major
categories: management, work itself, physical environment,
social/psychological environment, equipment design, and
worker/coworker. 27 Results of studies conducted from
accident events during the transportation of oil in maritime
operations yielded that 80 percent of high consequence
accidents are caused by human error, with the remaining
blame contributed to the environment. Of that 80 percent,
approximately 88 percent were caused by operations which
included society (culture), individual, organization, and
systerns. 23 Additionally, a pamphlet distributed by the
State of Washington's Department of Ecology indicated that
error factors were linked to insufficient training of
personnel and included: inadequate knowledge of operations;
or violations of procedures, poor communication during oil
handling operations, improper monitoring designs, drug or
alcohol abuse, overtired or overstressed employees, and lack
of emergency preparedness. 10
Most of these factors could certainly be ranked under
the mining accident categories. For example, overtired and
overstressed employees could be considered a viable listing
under the "work itself" category. Studies have been
conducted which indicate that workhours at sea are much more
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demanding and cause greater fatigue compared to working
ashore. This heightened level of eXhaustion is precipitated
by the constant, almost imperceptible, movement of the
working platform combined with external forces and internal
vibrations. 62 This physical fatigue can be somewhat
simulated through continuous physical activity under a hot
sun. For example, a person working in the yard mowing,
weeding, planting, etc. for several hours tires easily. The
body becomes lethargic, reflexes dull, and mental
attentiveness decreases. Crewman on board a vessel
encounter similar physical reactions. Therefore, the
relevance of fatigue as a common impetus for human
rnalperformance should not be considered lightly.
Additionally, poor communication can be considered for
the worker/coworker category and drug or alcohol abuse could
fall under the social/psychological classification. These
comparisons demonstrate that human error, ranging from
simple fatigue and inattention to miscommunications from
management, is a primary cause of accidents for all
industries (Table V) .
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TABLE V
A COMPARISON OF CAUSES OF HUMAN ERROR AMONG THE
NUCLEAR POWER, MINING, AND OIL TRANSPORT INDUSTRIES
Industry
Underground Mining
Oil Transport
Nuclear Power
Adapted from "Human Error", J. Reason 1991.
Error Causes
management, work itself:
physical environment, sociaV
psychological environment,
equipment design, and
worker/coworker
society (culture), individual,
organization, and systems,
insufficient training, operations,
procedure violations, poor
communication, improper
monitoring designs, drug/alcohol
abuse, fatigue, inattention
procedural omissions, absent-
mindedness, latent conditions
not considered, lack ofknowledge
or training, deficient procedures
and supervision
It has been mentioned that human error cannot be
reduced to zero; we will always be victims of "normal
accidents." This fact, however, cannot remit the worth of
implementing vigorous programs of human
error control aimed at reducing the frequency of human error
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and to contain its consequences. Human error should be
able to be contained by designing, implementing, and
managing effective, comprehensive error control programs
that are also consistent with cost-effective dernands. 21
Such applications are intended to improve plant performance
by increasing safety, efficiency, and motivation of
personnel; reducing the occurrence and consequences of human
error; and reducing long-term operating costs. More
specifically, human factors applications help ensure that
personnel are not expected to perform with greater speed,
accuracy, strength, or agility than they are capable of; can
clearly sense, and can correctly perceive to interpret all
information needed to perform assigned tasks; can remember
relevant information not provided in the situation; can
easily execute required actions; and are unburdened of
needless mental or physical demands. 27 Therefore, serious
accidents, like marine casualties, can be eliminated through
the careful application of preventative countermeasures.
The best countermeasures for the prevention of human-
based errors incorporate error control in disciplines of
human engineering and human factors technology. This
concentration is recognized to be essential for the control
of human error in all modern systems; especially in the
analysis of nuclear power plant failures like Chernobyl and
34
Three Mile Island. Error control reduces system operating
costs and substantial paybacks can be realized through the
reduction of costly catastrophic accidents. For example,
the Chemical Manufacturers Association estimated that human
error costs comprised $2 billion in property damage losses
and severe injuries to hundreds of employees of the industry
during 1985-1989. 27
Efforts are being made which are changing attitudes
toward the significance of controlling human related
accidents and increasing knowledge about managing human and
technical resources in an operational maritime environment.
The u.s. Army in conjunction with the Department of Defense
is working on methods to overcome human fatigue. The u.s.
Coast Guard is also developing a total systems approach to
the study of marine systems which will assist
understanding of human factors that affect
lead to marine casualties. Eventually
will be applied to improve design,
licensing, and operational pr~
.::mance and
.Jledge gained
staffing,
The Nuclear Regulatory
greatest handle on the ~~
.~sion, however, has the
It believes that accident
prevention is best ace ~shed by analyzing, on a daily
basis, every eve~t occurred not just the errors. The
significance of t~is procedure is to look for generic
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problems occurring within the system and determine the
correctability of the errors. Series of events which falter
the system are then more easily identified. For example, in
the INPO analysis discussed at the beginning of this chapter
only a relatively small proportion of the root causes (16%)
were actually initiated by front-line personnel failing to
follow procedures. By reviewing procedures on a daily basis
failures such as these can be significantly controlled.
If it is impossible to guarantee the elimination of
errors, then the development of more effective ways of
minimizing their consequences in unforgiving situations is
essential. By identify cornman or repetitious error events
the consequence of the event can be somewhat predicted.
Efforts can be efficiently tailored to reducing the impacts
of the error event while the actual human error sequence is
being analyzed. This step forward could stimulate similar
activities on all levels of operations; governmental,
industrial, public, and private.
Latent and Active Errors
Human error appears in many guises and has a variety of
causes. It is not surprising that no single, universally
applicable, error-reducing technique is available. But, by
determining error types, patterns can be identified which
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will enable researchers to address workable solutions.
Therefore, when considering the human contribution to system
disasters it is important to distinguish two kinds of error:
active and latent. 47
Active Errors
Active errors are associated with the performance
of the 'front-line' operators of a complex system: pilots,
air/vessel traffic controllers, ship's officers, control
room crews, etc. Their effects are felt and observed almost
immediately after they occur. Therefore, it is presumed
that the operators tend to be the inheritors of system
defects created by poor design rather than main instigators
of accidents.
Exceptions to this premise are violators of reasonably
established standards, rules, or procedures. For example,
when a competent individual in charge of operations makes a
significantly poor judgement error the integrity of the
system may still be intact, but adverse consequences may
result given inadequate direction. This scenario can be
epitomized in the decision events leading to the wreckage of
the London Valour; April 9, 1970. 5
Case study 1. The London Valour was a modern steam
powered bulk carrier of 15,947 gross tons and 593 feet long.
She was registered in the United Kingdom and was equipped
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with the latest navigational gear including radar, all of
which was operating satisfactorily. She was commanded by a
competent and well regarded master aided by a chief officer,
who had spent fourteen of his thirty years at sea and held a
master's foreign-going certificate. The crew, which
included fully qualified and competent officers and Chief
Engineers, was deemed significantly seaworthy and
dependable.
She was expected to anchor late in the day of April 7,
off the coast of Genoa, and maintain her berth for the four
following evenings. Only six shots of chain, (540 ft.), were
paid out to port .her anchor. At this point the Master
should have considered lengthening the amount of chain,
given the extended time she was to be at anchor, but to his
remiss he omitted the action. Afterall, the weather was
fine as she rode comfortably to her anchor; giving no cause
for alarm.
Two days later, while the London Valour continued to
ride peacefully to her berth, the Chief Officer noticed that
the vessel had unexpectedly swung to a southerly heading.
This change in direction brought the stern (rear) of the
vessel closer to the nearby breakwater. The probability of
the so far cooperative weather to deteriorate was noticed
and expressed by the 2nd Mate. Later that afternoon the
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wind had picked up considerably and still nothing had been
done about increasing the scope of the chain on the anchor.
Not long thereafter the Mate, noticed the ship had
moved significantly in a manner at variance with her usual
motion. It was found that the ship dragged its anchor onto
the breakwater. The London Valour struck the breakwater and
was driven along by the force of the wind and sea, opening
large gashes in the hull causing her to sink within minutes.
The Court found great difficulty in understanding how a
master with a distinguished record and vast experience could
have failed to take the simple precautions that should have
been second nature to him. As a result 20 of the 58 persons
aboard the vessel lost their lives including the Master and
his wife. 5
The active errors in this instance were not caused by
system failures. The ship's Master intelligibly misassessed
the situation without any complications from technical or
procedural failures. Therefore, the responsibility of human
failure can often be attributed to individual negligence not
just system inadequacies.
Active errors prompted by fatigue and inattention from
crewman is another indication of personal malfunctions.
Effectively reducing human errors of this type could
significantly reduce the frequency of marine accidents when
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technical malperformance is not the root cause. Programs
must be developed to analyze error events and determine root
and subsequent causes of active errors. This procedure
would enable management to differentiate the two primary
causes of active errors, human malperformance and system
inadequacies. As discussed, active errors are not the most
prevalent nor the most troublesome of error types.
Latent Errors
Latent errors pose the greatest threat to the safety of
complex systems. 47 The adverse consequences may lie dormant
within the system for a long time, only becoming evident
when they combine with other factors to breach the system's
integrity. Errors of this type include poorly designed
organizational policies, regulatory inadequacies, lack of
performance reviews and reprimands from upper management,
etc. The latter allows ill advised procedures to
continually plague the systems' processes.
Most of the root causes of serious accidents in complex
technologies are present within the system long before an
obvious accident sequence can be identified (e.g. the active
errors) .4 7 Operator's mistakes can be traced back to latent
decision errors made in the higher echelons of the system
long before an accident sequence even began. Therefore,
analysts frequently give much misdirected attention to the
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occurrence of active errors in determining error sources.
By their nature, it is generally difficult to quantify
the contribution made by latent errors to systems failures.
An interesting exception, however, are those committed
during the maintenance of nuclear power plants. Two
independent surveys conducted by Rasmussen, 1980 and INPO,
1984 (previously discussed), indicate that simple omissions-
the failure to carry out some of the actions necessary to
achieve a desired goal - constitute the single largest
category of human performance problems identified in the
significant event reports logged by nuclear plants. 47
Latent failures can also take many forms. They can be
defined as an error or omission of responsibility that was
committed prior to the start of the actual emergency and
played a necessary (though not sufficient) role in causing
the disaster. The Bhopal incident signifies this type of
latency.
Case Study 2. On December 2nd or 3rd, 1984, a gas
(methyl isocyanate MIC) leak from a small pesticide plant,
owned by a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corp., devastated the
city of Bhopal, India. At least 2,500 people were killed,
and more than 200,000 were injured. Incompetent management,
failed safety systems, and operator errors where a few
contributing factors to the accident.
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The obvious latent errors comprising this catastrophe
are both disturbing and regrettably common. These errors
are found in three primary categories: system, operator, and
hardware (Table VI). The first, system errors, were those
imbedded into the plant's processes long before the leak.
For instance, management failed to update its safety program
after encountering six prior accidents. This problem could
have been controlled through the implementation of training
programs to make the employees more aware of accident
prevention. But, after reviewing the quality of the staff,
advanced training would have been a waste of time.
The plant a~so employed and relied heavily on
inexperienced operators and supervisors of a highly
reduced staff. Even if the limited staff was highly
qualified, the probability of them accomplishing all
duties efficiently and correctly would be poor.
The internal make up of the Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, reinforces the idea that the greater the number of
pathogens residing in a system, the more likely it will
encounter the particular combination of triggering
conditions sufficient to complete an accident sequence. 47
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TABLE VI
ORIGINS AND LATENT FAILURES
LEADING TO THE BHOPAL DISASTER
Selected Latent Failures
1. System Errors
Locating a high risk plant close to densely
populated area
Poor emphasis on system safety~ no safety
improvements after adverse audits~ poor
evacuation
No improvement in safety measures, despite
six prior accidents
Safety measures not upgraded when plant
switched to large scale
Heavy reliance on inexperienced operators and
supervtsors
Factory inspector's warning on washing MIC
lines neglected
2. Operator Errors
Reduction in operating and maintenance staff
Using a nontrained superintendent for MIC plant
Not operating warning siren until leak became
severe
Switching off siren immediately after starting it
Failure to recognize that pressure rise was
abnormal
3. Hardware Errors
Refrigeration plant not operational
No automatic sensors to warn of temperature
increase
Pressure and temperature indicators did not work
Insufficient gas masks available
No regular cleaning of pipes and valves
Origins
GovemmentIManagement
Management
GovemmentIManagement
Management
Management
Management
Management
Management
Management
Management
Management/Operator
ManagementIMaintenance
DesignlManagement
ManagementIMaint.
Management
Maintenance/Mgt.
Data Generated from "Human Error", J. Reason 1991
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Discussion
The fact that accidents caused by human error are
prevelent in most, if not all industries, should inspire
added efforts to understand, manage, and possibly eliminate
these causal factors. The challenge is not to just provide
an account of how latent and active failures combine to
produce accidents, but also to indicate where and how more
effective remedial measures might be applied.
Through the study of human error events and
consequences, better equipped designs for prevention
management can be established. But where does the
responsibility lie for requiring and enforcing human factor
analysis?
Legislative, public, and private organizations must
stimulate efforts in this direction to change the status
quo: reaction to accidents that could have been prevented
through simple alterations in function, methods, and
programs. Until this concept is fully realized the natural
environment and the health of living organisms will be
adversely impacted by controllable error events.
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CHAPTER THREE
INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS:
A MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ERROR DETECTION
Introduction
To this point two key ideas have been discussed: the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 in actively reducing the frequency of oil spills
perpetuated by human errori and the commonality of human
error accidents across industries. These two discussions
have set the foundation for the contents of this chapter:
the use of influence diagrams as a preliminary tool or a
needs analysis for identifying common human. and technical
errors across similar accidents.
Research and expertise indicate that the majority of
high-consequence low-probability marine accidents have one
common theme: a chain of important errors made by people in
critical situations involving complex technological
systerns. 47 By identifying the commonality of errors from
accidents of the same magnitude analysts will be able to
locate error patterns set within company procedures.
Following the identification of these patterns the errors
can be grouped into two categories: human/operational-based
error and organizational/technical-based error.
Human/operational errors can largely be corrected through
well tailored training programs. Organizational/technical
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errors may respond better to system redesign or technical
maintenance. After the review of such events solutions for
error management can then be prescribed on a case by case
basis.
Training can be a productive tool for error management
if the error-training match is well researched, well
designed, well implemented, and adequately reviewed for
success. Failure in a training scheme can easily occur if
the source and solution identified from the error analysis
is mismatched. For example, if a bright, hard-working but
functionally illiterate crewman fails to follow the correct
company-designed safety policy and an accident follows, an
advanced safety t~aining program would be largely
ineffective. However, enrollment into a literacy program
usually offered by a city organization can vastly improve
the performance of the individual and the safety of the
crew.
Failures in performance may also stem from technical
malfunctions. In cases such as these, training employees
would do little to correct the fundamental cause of the
accident. An analysis of the workings of the system must be
conducted prior to addressing the human errors associated
with the malfunction to overcome the obstacle.
Influence diagrams can be used successfully in the
assessment of such errors. These diagrams are generic
enough to cross industry barriers and simple enough to allow
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the nontechnical manager to actively contribute in the
decision analysis.
Influence Diagrams-Usage
Traditionally, influence diagrams are used to assess
the probability of system failures given the presence of
human and organizational errors. An example of users of
influence diagrams includes studies conducted by
Dr. W.H. Moore and Dr. R.G. Bea from the University of
California at Berkeley. Their project team has developed a
detailed statistical analysis which calculates probability
values for system failures. A segment of this probabilistic
model determines the set of possible initiating accident
events (in.) and final states (fist) of the system. The
~ m
probability of lost components of the system can then be
represented by the following equation:
p(lOSSk)=~.~p(in.)p(fist \in.}p(losSk\fist) .31
~ m ~ m 1 m
The suggested use of the influence diagram for this
research is to assist management in establishing the
relevant contributing factors unique to specific accident
sequences. This technique can identify a causal
relationship between error events which may include errors
solely caused by human malperformance, technical
malfunctions or a combination of the two. A dependency
relationship can then determine the degree to which errors,
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risks, and consequences may be successfully managed or
controlled.
The diagram also gives insight to areas where more
intensive study may be warranted. After an error sequence
has been defined single error events along the sequence can
be dissected to determine added error causes. Human error
components can be identified as initiating or contributing
to the accident sequence. For example, in the Chernobyl
accident it was found that a valve malfunction was not
detected because an indicator light had simultaneously
malfunctioned. Was it the technician's responsibility to
catch the operational malfunction or not. A summary of the
accident indicated that it was a reasonable assumption that
the technician or engineer should have tested the integrity
of plant's safety operations. Without further investigation
into this accident that human factor might have gone
unchecked and might have remained in the system
indefinitely, or until another catastrophe occurred. The
detection of human-based errors can be more readily obtained
through the use of influence diagrams.
The flexibility and generality of the diagram allows
highly technical aspects to be removed as barriers for
understanding causal relationships. This enables
individuals from all disciplines of management to be
included in the analysis and error management designs.
48
The diagrams should be constructed through the
concerted efforts of various groups of specialists within
the organization including: line managers, operators,
engineers, top management, etc. These individuals should
interpret and explain their incident reports in clear and
unobtrusive language to facilitate a more user friendly
diagram. The less diluted the description the easier the
problem will be to identify across disciplines. Differences
of opinions regarding the relationships between events and
their causes inspire the development of more realistic and
intelligible models.
Modeling
The first step in the analysis process is to identify
the target event of the accident (for without one the
analysis would be useless). The target event is the actual
accident outcome (e.g. marine accident, vessel explosion,
etc.). Secondly, dependencies must be identified between
relevant events, decisions, and actions. 21 These
dependencies include:
Contributing/underlying events, decisions, and actions:
- occur prior to the initiating accident event
which contributes to the reduction of
reliability or increase in risk for the system.
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Initiating/direct accident events, decisions, actions:
- immediate accident events, decisions, and
actions resulting in the casualty.
Compounding or subsequent events, decisions, actions:
- lead to subsequent errors which magnify accident
consequences.
In the grounding of the Exxon Valdez these concepts can
be readily presented. For example, the underlying and
contributing factors of the disaster were caused by the
vessel leaving the traffic lane to avoid collision with
large pieces of glacial ice (Figure 3) .32 Secondly, the
initiating or direct factor of the accident was the
grounding itself.-. It was the immediate actions the crew and
vessel engaged in prior to the loss of oil; the target
event. Lastly, the compounding or subsequent events were
those actions and decisions that increased the magnitude of
the spill. Under Captain Hazelwood's command the crew
attempted to pull the vessel from Bligh Reef after the
grounding. (Its impact on the severity of the damage to the
vessel however, is still disputed.)
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Figure 3. An Adapted Mapped Version of the
Exxon Valdez Tracking Around Glacial Ice
Components
The components of influence diagrams contain l)decision
and chance nodes, 2) arrows, 3}deterministic nodes, and
4)value nodes. Decisions are represented by square nodes in
the diagram. Chance nodes are circles or ovals and are
characteristic of uncertain events. Arrows indicate the
relevance between the two nodes; event B was influenced by
event A. Deterministic nodes, represented by double-lined
ovals, depend deterministically upon their predecessors. 31
The scattered nature of the diagram reduces the
illusion of a sequentially patterned series of events. The
interrelationships can be quite confusing at first, but
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logical after review. Each node may have many relationships
within the diagram. For example, in the Piper Alpha diagram
(Figure 4) the explosion, a deterministic node, depends
solely on the system shutdown and ignition source nodes. 31
Since the shutdown oval is a deterministic node the
explosion could not have occurred had the system remained
operable. The degree to which the ignition source
contributed to the explosion is however, unknown, but
identifiable as a factor. Given the same example it is
apparent that the explosion severity depended upon the event
of the explosion and was regulated by the uncertainty of the
leak size; a subsequent action.
Discussion
As illustrated, well documented case histories can give
valuable insight into the interaction of causal
relationships over an extended period of time. This assists
in determining the sources of human and technical errors in
various states and stages of accident scenarios. Once these
error types have been identified management schemes can be
developed to reduce the frequency of human-based errors and
technical malfunctions.
The diagram discussed in this chapter can serve as a
starting point for an error analysis. Patterns in
behavioral and technical malfunctions can be shown in a
graphical representation. Various causal relationships can
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be identified along an accident sequence which will enable
researches to pinpoint root causes of an accident, human or
technical. The question may arise: was a crewman's
inattention to detail the cause of an accident or did the
operational equipment falter? An influence diagram cannot
answer this question directly, but can give specific insight
to the decisions, actions, and events conducted prior to,
during, and after the accident sequence. This insight will
enable researchers to focus on human errors that can be
eliminated and technical systems that cannot be properly
managed given human limitations.
The influence diagram can also be expanded to
incorporate a more comprehensive analysis for like error
sequences encompassing a number of similar accidents. After
all, similar accidents often yield reproduced errors. For
example, collisions that occur when vessels sail too close
to one another are often caused by misinterpretation or
dismissal of the Collision Avoidance Regulations; misreading
of the signals of approaching vessels; or inattention to
duty and available technologies on the bridge.
In other words, deficiencies in human performance can
be patternerized across similar accident scenarios such as
vessel collisions. If a pattern can be identified by case-
study review then companies can identify human and technical
error patterns in their own organizations. Other companies
of like operational make-up can draw from the experiences
and analyses of competitors and design their systems to
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avoid human caused accidents. This would be a significant
breakthrough for reducing the frequency of human-based
accidents that adversely impact the natural environment.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Identifying the human element as a relevant regulatory
concern is, in theory, ideal for fostering a preventative
mind set in todays congress. Since human-based accidents
are not predictable it is difficult and unrealistic for
legislation to regulate an unpredictable phenomena. This
research however, can initiate motivation towards the study
and understanding of human error events and the construction
of a networking link between organizations and legislators
alike.
The indicating of error types among industries may
illustrate the repetitive nature of human-based errors. If
these repetitive characteristics can be identified then
companies will be able to recognize warning signs within
their operations and take action before the accident can
occur. The influence diagram can be used to accomplish this
task.
An influence diagram analysis of like accidents
involving workers with limited work experience and education
or operating under highly repetitive tasks, can indicate
reproduced error behaviors. Similarities in performance may
exist among individuals with comparable education levels or
work-related training. If companies could identify
performance problems on a somewhat generic basis they can
combat the problem through quality control measures
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including: enhanced employee evaluation and training
programs, job redesign, and industry wide training
standards. These analysis findings can be reported and used
by other companies within the same industry to assist in
reducing the impacts and frequency of human-based errors.
Other areas that could benefit from using an influence
diagram would be any organization, be it private, public, or
not-for-profit, that find its employees causing accidents.
Governmental organizations can evaluate their daily
operations and determine areas that are slow in
accomplishing tasks. What human factors are slowing
progress and which human-based delays can be minimized?
On a natural environment scale, congress can use the
diagram to evaluate industry practices that are plagued with
human-related accidents and cause catastrophic environmental
impacts. After the analysis is conducted congress can
regulate industries by either requiring certified training
programs or other means to ensure the safety of the
environment from further industry perpetuated destruction.
Training can be an effective tool to foster the
minimization of human errors in an organization. The
influence diagrams can identify areas of needed reform and
increased training, the type and duration of training
however, must be prescribed by a knowledgeable professional.
The influence diagram should be used to identify problem
areas, but to utilize its full potential it must be used in
conjunction with qualified individuals.
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APPENDIXB
THE PHASING OUT SCHEDULE FOR
SINGLE HULLED VESSELS OPERATING IN U.S. WATERS
Situation A - vessels of at least 5,000 gross tons but less than 15,000 gross tons-
- after January 1, 1995, ifthe vessel is 40 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
45 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides·,
- after January 1, 1996, if the vessel is 39 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
44 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1997, if the vessel is 38 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
43 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1998, if the vessel is 37 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
42 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1999, if the vessel is 36 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
41 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2000, if the vessel is 35 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
40 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2005, if the vessel is 25 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
30 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
Situation B - vessels of at least 15,000 gross tons but less than 30,000 gross tons -
- after January 1, 1995, if the vessel is 40 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
45 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1996, if the vessel is 38 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
43 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1997, if the vessel is 36 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
41 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1998, if the vessel is 34 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
39 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1999, if the vessel is 32 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
37 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2000, if the vessel is 30 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
35 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2001, if the vessel is 29 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
34 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2002, if the vessel is 28 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
33 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2003, if the vessel is 27 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
32 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
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- after January I, 2004, ifthe vessel is 26 years old or older and has a single hull, or is
31 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January I, 2005, ifthe vessel is 25 years old or older and has a single hull. or is
30 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
Situation C - vessels of at least 30,000 gross tons -
- after January 1, 1995, if the vessel is 28 years old or older and has a single hull, or
33 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1996, if the vessel is 27 years old or older and has a single hull, or
32 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1997, if the vessel is 26 years old or older and has a single hull, or
31 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1998, if the vessel is 25 years old or older and has a single hull, or
30 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 1999, if the vessel is 24 years old or older and has a single hull, or
29 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides;
- after January 1, 2000, if the vessel is 23 years old or older and has a single hull, or
28 years old or older and has a double bottom or double sides~
• a vessel that has a single hun may not operate after January 1, 2010
•• a vessel that has a double bottom or double sides may not operate after January 1, 2010
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APPENDIX C
A SYNAPSES OF THE EXXON VALDEZ
GROUNDING - MARCH 24, 1989
On March 24, 1989, at 12:04a.m., the largest U.S. oil catastrophe threatened a $150
million-a-year fishing industry, and scarred one ofAlaska's most pristine environments - Prince
William Sound. The Exxon Valdez was loaded with 1.2 million barrels ofcrude oil and was
fitted with the latest safety equipment. Through the absence ofqualified command and the
inexperience of the crewmen left in charge, the Valdez, in seemingly perfect weather, literally
skidded into a pinnacle of Bligh Reef.
The impact of this grounding brought the ship from a speed of 12 knots to a dead stop
almost immediately. (it normally takes a tanker of its size three miles and twenty minutes to stop
from a top speed of fifteen to sixteen knots). Damage reports indicated that eight of the eleven
cargo tanks were ruptured releasing 10,836,000 gallons of crude oil at such a force that oil
surged to the ,surface in 3ft. waves. The extent of damages to the body of the 246,000-ton
supertanker included five huge gashes in the hull; the largest being 6ft. wide and 20ft. long.
Many factors contributed to the degree of destruction the spill created on Prince
Williams' shorelines. The inadequacy of the Alyeska response plan, and the delayed
disbursement, ofbioremedial techniques ordered by the Coast Guard greatly magnified the
impacts ofthe spill. Alyeska, a consortium for several oil companies with interests invested i the
Alaskan region, had the first responsibility to respond to the spill.
Its clean up response plan was designed so that a team ofworkers employing a barge full
ofgear (containment devices such as booms, sorbents, skimmers, etc.) would reach a stricken
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ship within five hours after notification that a spill had occurred. Prior to March 24th however,
the barge gear had been unloaded for repair and had not been restocked onto the barge.
Additionally, ofthe 50 workers gathered for assistance only one knew how to operate the
forklifts or cranes. As a result the barge did not arrive at the spill until fourteen hours after
notification ofthe accident rather than the proposed five.
This oversight easily reduced the probability of effective containment efforts prescribed
in the Alyeska Response Plan. The Coast Guard also reduced containment probabilities by
significantly delaying the disbursement of bioremedial chemicals to be used as dispersants.
these chemicals would have disaggregated the slick into droplets of ten microns in diameter to be
dispersed and dissipated into the water column and metabolized by bacteria; and unfortunately
other organisms as well.
The leading principle for use of such dispersants it to prevent the oil from stranding on
sensitive shorelines. A critical factor which determines the effectiveness both economically and
physically of dispersants is that the viscosity of oil increases rapidly with weathering and low
temperatures. Since more viscous oil is more difficult to disperse, response within a few hours is
essential to high effectiveness in the treatment or containment of oil spills.
Unfortunately, when the Coast Guard finally wavered its earlier decision a spring storm
hit the Sound producing winds up to 73 miles per hour~ grounding the planes. The following day
the pilots discovered that the spill had spread over more than one hundred square miles. The
spill had spread to such a degree that dispersants would have been an economical and ecological
waste of time and money.
This distance however, covered only one quarter of the extent the oil eventually traveled.
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On day eleven of the spill response efforts the spread of oil reached 140 miles; on day 30 it
reached 280 miles; and on day S6 the spill contaminated 470 miles ofcoastal environments.
As the seas calmed and the impact reports were filed the of ecological and economical
damages were phenomenal. Exxon however, made a valiant, largely voluntary effort to go above
and beyond the clean up requirements imposed by regulators and relevant officials. Of the 1,090
miles contaminated by the spill Exxon managed to treat 1,087~ leaving by their calculations 3
miles of contaminated shorelines. The state however claimed that 1 000 additional miles still, ,
remained contaminated.
Among the costs of the clean up, workers were hired at $16.95 an hour to wipe off
individual rocks with absorbent pads or blast oil out using high-pressure hoses. Exxon also
shipped in free groceries for native villagers and made up the differences in economic losses for
fisherman who caught less fish that season compared to the previous year. The total cost of
Exxon's clean up efforts was estimated qat $1.28 billion with $400 million to be reimbursed by
insurance companies. Of the 10,836,000 gallons of crude oil spilled approximately 2,604,000
gallons were recovered. The recovery process and clean up effort generated 24,000 tons of
additional waste.
In addition to economic losses ecological damages of 33, 126 dead birds including 138
dead eagles and 980 dead otters were reported. Exxon's animal safety and clean up programs
helped many animals but a greater percentage still perished.
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